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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

:

Case No. 890583-CA

s

RICKY PALMER,

:

Priority No.

2

Defendant-Petitioner. :
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant presents two issues in his petition for
rehearing:
1.

Did the Court erroneously remand this case to the

trial court for a determination of the inevitable discovery
question?
2.

If the Court correctly remanded the case to the

trial court for a determination of the inevitable discovery
question, does the Court's opinion give adequate guidance to the
lower court concerning the scope of its consideration of that
question?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ricky Palmer, was charged with retail theft,
a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602 and 76-6412(l)(b)(i) (1990) (R. 6-7).
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress, defendant entered and the court accepted a conditional
guilty plea to the charge pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d

935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (R. 31-37; T. 81-83)*

Under Sery,

defendant preserved the suppression issue for appellate review.
On appeal, this Court ruled that the trial court had
erroneously denied defendant's motion to suppress the x-ray of
defendant, because the warrantless x-ray, which revealed the
presence of the stolen ring in defendant's body, violated the
fourth amendment.

However, the Court remanded the case to the

trial court to determine whether the ring would inevitably have
been discovered by the police.

State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv.

Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1990).

Defendant petitioned for

rehearing, and this Court requested that the State .file a
response.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the facts pertinent to defendant's petition for
rehearing are accurately set forth in the Court's opinion.
Palmer, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42-43.

One additional relevant

fact not set forth there is that after Sgt. Mayo was unable to
secure a suitable isolation cell for defendant at the Salt Lake
County Jail, he sought and obtained defendant's apparent consent
to an x-ray examination (T. 13, 28, 30-31).

Defendant accurately

sets forth in his petition the portion of Sgt. Mayo's testimony
that is relevant to the question of what arrangements he pursued
with the Salt Lake County Jail concerning an isolation cell for
defendant.

Pet. at 3-6.

A stipulation of facts entered into by

the parties further described the circumstances of defendant's
placement in an isolation cell.

That stipulation was as follows:

[I]f Det. Earl Price were called, he would
testify to several things. First would be

that he arranged for Mr. Palmer
in the Salt Lake County Jail in
cell where Mr. Palmer could not
Palmer's feces could not leave,
be retained.

to be placed
an isolation
leave and Mr.
and it would

Additionally, that he informed Mr. Palmer
that he would remain in the cell until the
ring was produced and that Mr. Palmer, in
response to that, admitted that he had the
ring and eventually did produce the ring to
Det. Price who has the ring in custody and
that if he were called he would bring the
ring and it would be produced into evidence.
(T. 61-62).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In arguing that the stolen ring contained in
defendant's body would inevitably have been discovered by the
police, the State necessarily relied on the record developed in
the trial court.

Accordingly, the State agrees with defendant

that a remand of the case for further factual development would
not be proper.

However, the State disagrees with defendant that

"the evidence [presented to the trial court] is capable of a
single factual determination which leads to the legal conclusion
that the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable to the
instant case."

Pet. at 11. Although admittedly a close

question, the trial court could find that the record demonstrates
by a preponderance of the evidence that the ring would inevitably
have been discovered through lawful means—i.e., that the record
demonstrates that the police, once they suspected that defendant
had swallowed the ring, intended to place defendant in an
isolation cell at some point in an effort to recover the ring.
Therefore, the Court could properly remand the case to
the trial court for the limited purpose of determining, based on

the record already developed, the "fact-sensitive" question of
whether the ring would inevitably have been discovered by the
police.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate only when the
Court has "misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or
facts, or . • . overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or . . . based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, or . . . misapplied or overlooked something
which materially affects the result."
Utah 157, 172, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913).

Cummings v. Nielson, 42
The argument portion of

this brief will demonstrate that rehearing is not warranted.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT APPROPRIATELY REMANDED DEFENDANT'S
CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF
THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ISSUE.
After ruling that the trial court had erroneously
determined that the warrantless x-ray of defendant was lawful,
this Court remanded defendant's case to the trial court for a
determination of the "fact-sensitive" issue concerning inevitable
discovery of the ring.

State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42,

45 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1990).

Defendant claims that a remand

is inappropriate because "the evidence [presented to the trial
court] is capable of a single factual determination which leads
to the legal conclusion that the inevitable discovery doctrine is
not applicable to the instant case."

Pet. at 11.

Contrary to

defendant's view, this Court appropriately remanded the
inevitable discovery question to the trial court for an initial
determination.

As defendant correctly points out, Sgt. Mayo's
testimony is critical to a determination of whether the ring
would inevitably have been discovered by the police through their
placement of defendant in an isolation cell, as they did after
obtaining the x-ray which revealed the ring inside of defendant's
body.

Admittedly, it is not entirely clear from Mayo's testimony

what the intentions of the police were with respect to isolating
defendant prior to the time the incriminating x-ray was obtained.
However, his testimony, coupled with other evidence, raises a
question of fact about whether defendant would necessarily have
been placed in an isolation cell by the police in 311 effort to
recover the ring, regardless of whether an x-ray of defendant had
been obtained.

Contrary to defendant's contention, Mayo's

testimony is not susceptible to only one interpretation—i.e.,
that once Mayo had received word from the jail that the requested
isolation cell was not available, the police did not intend to
place defendant in such a cell at some future time (as they
ultimately did).

Clearly, Mayo was interested in securing a

suitable isolation cell, and when that was not immediately
available, he sought defendant's consent to an x-ray examination.
Having received defendant's apparent consent to an x-ray, Mayo
discontinued his efforts to secure an isolation cell.
Nevertheless, such a cell was subsequently used by the police to
recover the ring.

Given the suspicions of the police that

defendant had swallowed the ring, and Mayo's initial efforts to
place defendant in isolation (efforts which appear to have been
temporarily terminated because defendant consented to an x-ray),

it seems quite clear that the police would have placed defendant
in an isolation cell in an effort to recover the ring, even
without the incriminating x-ray.

In short, the police would have

done so whether they had been certain that defendant had
swallowed the ring (which they were after the x-ray of defendant)
or merely suspicious that he had swallowed the ring (which they
would have been had they not obtained an x-ray), since the only
means of recovering the ring, an important piece of physical
evidence, would be to place defendant in isolation.
Although on remand the trial court would not be
obligated to make the foregoing findings regarding inevitable
discovery, it could validly do so and thus conclude that the
record demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the
ring would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means
by the police.

See United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d

1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The 'inevitable discovery' exception
adopted by the Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984),
allows the introduction of illegally obtained evidence if the
government can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
tainted evidence would inevitably have been discovered through
lawful means.").

See also State v. Vincik, 436 N.W.2d 350, 354

(Iowa 1989) (though gun on bed under sheet obtained in illegal
warrantless search at homicide scene, inevitable discovery rule
applicable, as the gun was certain to be discovered upon later
removal of body).

And such a ruling would be consistent with the

requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine that "'the fact
or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable arise from

circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search
itself.'"

Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1396 (quoting United

States v. Boatwriqht, 822 F.2d 862, 864-64 (9th Cir. 1987)).

In

short, the trial court should be given the opportunity to address
this open, and admittedly close, factual question.
Therefore, the Court appropriately remanded defendant's
case to the trial court for an initial determination of the factsensitive issue of inevitable discovery.

It correctly concluded

that "[t]his court cannot properly determine the outcome of a
fact-sensitive issue where the record below is not clear and
uncontroverted, or capable of only one finding."

Palmer/ 147

Utah Adv. Rep. at 45 (citation omitted).
The State agrees with defendant that the trial court's
determination should be made upon the record already developed
before it, and that the taking of additional evidence would not
be appropriate.

If the Court concurs in this view and further

believes that its opinion does not make this view clear, it
should modify its opinion accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should deny
rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c^Z

day of January, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
ft
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Response to Petition for Rehearing were mailed,
postage prepaid, to James C. Bradshaw and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Assoc,, Attorneys for Petitioner, 424 East 500
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this g%£
January, 1991.

<Aay Qf

^^
t?Sfi~—

